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opinion. They will let the arbitrator decide after hearing all the evidence,
whether respondents seek consequential damages, or whether their claim has
merit.
The DeLiflo Const. Co. v. Lizz & Sons case,2 2 also relied upon by peti-
tioner, dealt with a narrow arbitration clause such as the one found in the
Marchant case and is therefore not applicable here where the clause was deter-
mined to be broad in its scope.
The dissent in the case at bar, relying on the majority's concluding state-
ment,2 3 believes that this decision would bar the court from hearing any motion
to stay an award, claiming the statement makes the decision of the arbitrators
"final and conclusive in any event." However, the majority explicitly stated
that any determination "in advance" of arbitration would be inappropriate.
(Emphasis added.) 24 This leads the writer to the conclusion that where the
arbitration clause is broad enough, the court will allow any claim of damage
to go to the arbitrator, reserving in the parties the availability of Article 84 of
the New York Civil Practice Act to contest the legality of an award in an
appropriate court of law. This is consistent with the wording and intent of the
appropriate Sections of Article 84 (Sections 1462-1462-a). It may also ease
the court's task of determining the validity of an award, because, when an
action would be brought before them under these Sections, it would be after
the arbitrator has heard all the evidence on both sides; and since he usually
is someone familiar with the industry (if not a member of it) his decision
would probably reflect the general attitude of that industry about such dam-
ages, thereby allowing the court to better achieve the intent of the parties
when they entered into the agreement.
J. D.
STAY OF PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT BEFORE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY IN
VIOLATION OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
In S. M. Wolff Co. v. Tulkoff,21 the parties engaged in telephone conver-
sations concerning the purchase of imported horseradish roots. The petitioners
(brokers) thereafter mailed to respondents two "Bought Notes," covering the
purchase in question, which contained broad arbitration clauses. Upon the
arrival of the goods, they were accepted and paid for by respondents. There-
after respondents lodged a preliminary complaint with the United States
Department of Agriculture,2 6 claiming that the shipments failed "to grade
according to contract." After a hearing at which the parties failed to reach a
settlement, respondents lodged a formal complaint with the Department of
22. 7 N.Y.2d 102, 195 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1959).
23. DeLaurentiis v. Cinematografica, Etc., supra note 1 at 510, 215 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
24. Ibid. See Matter of Transpacific Transp. Corp. (Sirena Shipping Co., S.A.), 9
A.D.2d 316, 321, 193 N.Y.S.2d 277, 283 (1st Dep't 1959).
25. 9 N.Y.2d 356, 214 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1961), reversing 11 A.D.2d 656, 203 N.Y.S,2d 1020
(Ist Dep't 1960).
26. Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. § 499(f) (1958).
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Agriculture. Petitioner, instead of answering this complaint, relied upon the
arbitration provisions in the "Bought Notes" and filed a petition pursuant to
Section 1451 of the Civil Practice Act to stay the proceedings presently before
the Department of Agriculture.
2 7
The novel question presented by this case is whether Section 1451 author-
izes the courts of New York to stay proceedings which are pending before an
administrative agency of the Federal Government. Respondents claim that they
are not and contend that Section 1451 empowers the New York courts to stay
only proceeding before New York tribunals. The Supreme Court agreed with
this contention and denied the petitioners' motion.28 The Court of Appeals,
reversing both Special Term and the Appellate Division, held that the "broad,
unqualified language and absence of limiting words" in Section 1451 gives the
courts of this state the power to stay proceedings irregardless of where they
were initiated, so long as the issues are referable to arbitration in New York.
In a recent case the Appellate Division affirmed a Special Term holding
that Section 1451 empowers the New York courts to stay proceedings pending
in the courts of other States where the contract provided for arbitration in New
York.20 This decision supports the Court of Appeals' holding in the present
case.
This decision appears to this writer as a sound one in view of the language
of Section 1451 and the traditional view that the court will try to achieve the
intent of the parties when construing contracts. If the parties, of their own
volition, have agreed to arbitrate in New York any disputes arising under any
contract they may make, they have waived their rights to any other action.
The Court, in the present decision, is merely giving effect to the expressed
intent of the parties and enforcing the provisions of a valid agreement.
If the Court had not held this way, arbitration clauses and the provision
of Article 84 of the New York Civil Practice Act would become meaningless
words without force or power. The Court has, in effect, decided that once a
party agrees to arbitration as the sole remedy for any disputes arising out of
a contract, the New York courts have the power to hold him to his contractual
obligation. If he desired recourse to any other remedy, in addition to arbitra-
tion, he could have easily provided for it in the contract; but since he has
not, he will be bound by his obligation to arbitrate.
Before reversing the judgment below and granting the petitioner's motion,
27. N.Y. Civ. Prac § 1451:
If any action or proceeding be brought upon any issue otherwise referable to arbi-
tration under a contract or submission described in section fourteen hundred forty-
eight, the supreme court or the court in which such action or proceeding shall be
brought, or a judge thereof, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such
action or proceeding is referable to arbitration . . ., shall stay all proceedings in
the action or proceedings until such arbitration has been had in accordance with
the terms of the contract or submission.
28. 24 Misc. 2d 71, 204 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
29. Demchick v. American Eutectic Welding Alloys S. Co., 22 Misc. 2d 920, 201
N.Y.S.2d 819 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 11 A.D.2d 771, 204 N.Y.S.2d 889 (2d Dep't 1960).
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the Court had to dispose of two other arguments which had been advanced by
respondent but were not decided by the courts below. Respondent contends
that the initial telephone conversation between himself and petitioner had
"closed the deal" and that, therefore, he had made no contract to arbitrate the
present dispute. 30 Respondent further contended that even if a valid contract
to arbitrate existed, petitioner has waived his right to arbitrate by reason of
both laches and his (petitioner) participation in the proceedings before the
Department of Agriculture. The Court of Appeals felt that both issues present
questions of fact which should be resolved at a further hearing to be held at
Special Term. The judgment below is therefore reversed and the matter re-
manded to Special Term for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
J.D.
PETITIONER, BY PARTICIPATING IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS, WAIVES RIGHT
TO CLAIM THAT DISPUTE IS NOT ARBITRABLE
Petitioner, in National Cash Register Co. v. Wilson,8 ' had entered into a
collective bargaining agreement with respondent union, providing for, among
other things, seniority rights among the employees. The agreement also con-
tained a broad arbitration clause. Four years later, the union called an economic
strike, which was settled by two supplemental agreements, extending the orig-
inal collective bargaining agreement for one year and providing in essence that,
except for a ten day period immediately following the strike settlement, workers
were to be recalled in accordance with the seniority provisions of the existing
collective bargaining agreement. Respondent, alleging that petitioner had vio-
lated these supplemental agreements by not applying seniority rights among all
the employees-those who did not strike at all and those who had been recalled
during the ten day period-but only among those who were still out because
of the strike, sought arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the original
collective bargaining agreement. Petitioner, although objecting to arbitration
on the ground that the dispute was not covered by the arbitration clause in
the original collective bargaining agreement, fully participated in all proceed-
ings. The arbitrators decided in favor of the union on the merits and petitioners
contend that the arbitration clause of the main contract does not extend to
disputes arising under the supplemental agreements. Although Special Term
vacated the award on the above ground, the Appellate Division reversed and
confirmed the award, holding that the arbitration clause applied to the supple-
mental agreements.82 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division,
stating that the references in the original collective bargaining agreement to
"any supplements to it" must be read as intending to give the arbitrators
authority to pass on any dispute arising not only from the main agreement,
30. For a discussion of these issues, see student note on Matter of Exercycle Corp.
(Maratta), appearing p. 75 supra.
31. 8 N.Y.2d 377, 208 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1960).
32. 7 A.D.2d 550, 184 N.Y.S.2d 957 (3d Dep't 1959).
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